{
  "annotation_id": "fe9ea86e-880b-40af-be5b-0a5bf6886ed3",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:44.351000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:44.351000Z",
  "file_hash": "276e0cf7a783b2361d18197973a77d8e6a5cf7eb51d6080e2b027b69878771dd",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "All incoherent as well as 2- and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies on\nthe 6 state protocol of quantum cryptography are classified. For a disturbance\nof 1/6, the optimal incoherent eavesdropping strategy reduces to the universal\nquantum cloning machine. Coherent eavesdropping cannot increase Eve\u0027s Shannon\ninformation, neither on the entire string of bits, nor on the set of bits\nreceived undisturbed by Bob. However, coherent eavesdropping can increase as\nwell Eve\u0027s Renyi information as her probability of guessing correctly all bits.\nThe case that Eve delays the measurement of her probe until after the public\ndiscussion on error correction and privacy amplification is also considered. It\nis argued that by doing so, Eve gains only a negligibly small additional\ninformation.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9807041",
    "authors": [
      "H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci",
      "N. Gisin"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.59.4238",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A, 59, 4238-4248, 1999",
    "title": "Incoherent and Coherent Eavesdropping in the 6-state Protocol of Quantum   Cryptography",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9807041"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "cb03da55-4264-4422-9ca8-2401f00b19f5",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}