{
  "annotation_id": "fa882989-d38d-45c7-814c-186f247729e5",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:34.668000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:34.668000Z",
  "file_hash": "cabad66c097bb34077539be6cc5943ab55e9d3fc8230318bf72ffe3b577893c8",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We present the optimal collective attack on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)\nprotocol in the \"device-independent\" security scenario, where no assumptions\nare made about the way the QKD devices work or on what quantum system they\noperate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one\nof the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of\nviolation of a Bell-type inequality.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0702152",
    "authors": [
      "Antonio Acin",
      "Nicolas Brunner",
      "Nicolas Gisin",
      "Serge Massar",
      "Stefano Pironio",
      "Valerio Scarani"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.230501",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007)",
    "title": "Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective   attacks",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702152"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "7ce57908-9780-4001-9763-8767cb019742",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}