{
  "annotation_id": "f1dcde8d-55c9-4769-a4f0-82b605aaacb5",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:35.339000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:35.339000Z",
  "file_hash": "7196e8f9ea3d2d0db73e02274fb768912b1ab57f35b265186431e1e42dcb2a3b",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be\nobtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is\nevolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations,\nwhere strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always\nevolutionarily stable. However, in finite populations stochastic effects can\ndrive the system away from strict Nash equilibria, which gives rise to a new\nconcept for evolutionary stability. The conventional and the new stability\nconcepts may apparently contradict each other leading to conflicting\npredictions in large yet finite populations. We show that the two concepts can\nbe derived from the frequency dependent Moran process in different limits. Our\nresults help to determine the appropriate stability concept in large finite\npopulations. The general validity of our findings is demonstrated showing that\nthe same results are valid employing vastly different co-evolutionary\nprocesses.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0609021",
    "authors": [
      "Arne Traulsen",
      "Jorge M. Pacheco",
      "Lorens A. Imhof"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevE.74.021905",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review E 74, 021905, 2006",
    "title": "Stochasticity and evolutionary stability",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0609021"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c2a12d58-f186-4d67-bc5b-50a49185fe15",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}