dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaThe Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Entanglement 2: Application to Proof of Security for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography
| Authors | M. D. Reid |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0112039 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112039 |
Abstract
In a previous paper certain measurable criteria have been derived, that are sufficient to demonstrate the existence of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations for measurements with continuous variable outcomes. Here it is shown how such EPR criteria, which do not demand perfect EPR correlations, can be used to prove the extent of security for continuous variable quantum cryptographic schemes (in analogy to that proposed by Ekert) where Alice and Bob hope to construct a secure sequence of values from measurements performed on continuous-variable EPR-correlated fields sent from a distant source. It is proven that the demonstration of the EPR criterion on Alice's and Bob's joint statistics compels a necessary loss in the ability to infer the results shared by Alice and Bob, by measurements performed on any third channel potentially representing an eavesdropper (Eve). This result makes no assumption about the nature of the quantum source of the fields transmitted to Alice and Bob, except that the EPR correlations are observed at the final detector locations. In this way a means is provided to establish security in the presence of some loss and less than optimal correlation, and against any eavesdropping strategy employed by Eve prior to detection of the fields by Alice and Bob.
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"abstract": "In a previous paper certain measurable criteria have been derived, that are\nsufficient to demonstrate the existence of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)\ncorrelations for measurements with continuous variable outcomes. Here it is\nshown how such EPR criteria, which do not demand perfect EPR correlations, can\nbe used to prove the extent of security for continuous variable quantum\ncryptographic schemes (in analogy to that proposed by Ekert) where Alice and\nBob hope to construct a secure sequence of values from measurements performed\non continuous-variable EPR-correlated fields sent from a distant source. It is\nproven that the demonstration of the EPR criterion on Alice\u0027s and Bob\u0027s joint\nstatistics compels a necessary loss in the ability to infer the results shared\nby Alice and Bob, by measurements performed on any third channel potentially\nrepresenting an eavesdropper (Eve). This result makes no assumption about the\nnature of the quantum source of the fields transmitted to Alice and Bob, except\nthat the EPR correlations are observed at the final detector locations. In this\nway a means is provided to establish security in the presence of some loss and\nless than optimal correlation, and against any eavesdropping strategy employed\nby Eve prior to detection of the fields by Alice and Bob.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0112039",
"authors": [
"M. D. Reid"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"title": "The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Entanglement 2: Application to Proof of Security for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112039"
},
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