{
  "annotation_id": "efe88d5f-54ca-436f-b315-ccfa5871c972",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.522000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.522000Z",
  "file_hash": "efde9654f41a9ea4f10ce509f0b85651ac431b5debc4e4d8a95eb85d7139242b",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We investigate the possibility of \"having someone carry out the work of\nexecuting a function for you, but without letting him learn anything about your\ninput\". Say Alice wants Bob to compute some known function f upon her input x,\nbut wants to prevent Bob from learning anything about x. The situation arises\nfor instance if client Alice has limited computational resources in comparison\nwith mistrusted server Bob, or if x is an inherently mobile piece of data.\nCould there be a protocol whereby Bob is forced to compute f(x) \"blindly\", i.e.\nwithout observing x? We provide such a blind computation protocol for the class\nof functions which admit an efficient procedure to generate random input-output\npairs, e.g. factorization. The cheat-sensitive security achieved relies only\nupon quantum theory being true. The security analysis carried out assumes the\neavesdropper performs individual attacks.\n  Keywords: Secure Circuit Evaluation, Secure Two-party Computation,\nInformation Hiding, Information gain vs disturbance.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0309152",
    "authors": [
      "Pablo Arrighi",
      "Louis Salvail"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "Int. J. of Quantum Information, Vol. 4, No. 5, (2006), pp883-898",
    "title": "Blind Quantum Computation",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0309152"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "2c952017-9351-405e-a517-8c9e3a7780af",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}