{
  "annotation_id": "ee093cc4-47aa-440b-9a4b-b2ad4956f185",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.958000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.958000Z",
  "file_hash": "83720ad279d008b1887b81f820c6a0b446219a43423e8456f5b028db13bbb8e7",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is\nsufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel.\nIn the security regime, the purification process factorises the overall initial\nstate into a tensor-product state of Alice and Bob, on one side, and Eve on the\nother side, thus establishing a completely private, albeit noisy, quantum\ncommunication channel between Alice and Bob. The security regime is found to\ncoincide for all practical purposes with the purification regime of a two-way\nrecurrence protocol. This makes two-way entanglement purification protocols,\nwhich constitute an important element in the quantum repeater, an efficient\ntool for secure long-distance quantum cryptography.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0111066",
    "authors": [
      "Hans Aschauer",
      "Hans J. Briegel"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.66.032302",
    "title": "A security proof of quantum cryptography based entirely on entanglement   purification",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0111066"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "a3cdef5b-4165-4dcf-a1d0-9cc698093544",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}