{
  "annotation_id": "e9cce38d-6968-45da-87e3-5df504f9ec15",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:29.885000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:29.885000Z",
  "file_hash": "82eb65ec0b5d9c74ea9cfa4b68d4114823b2ad846eab28bb96ae4ea79e26a20c",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a\nsecurity loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that\nuse a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-efficiency\ntransition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of\na decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of\nGaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of\nsecure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to\nTrojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0607186",
    "authors": [
      "Danna Rosenberg",
      "Jim W. Harrington",
      "Patrick R. Rice",
      "Philip A. Hiskett",
      "Charles G. Peterson",
      "Richard J. Hughes",
      "Adriana E. Lita",
      "Sae Woo Nam",
      "Jane E. Nordholt"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.010503",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 010503 (2007)",
    "title": "Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0607186"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c18932dc-08be-4e50-97c8-354a7678a779",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}