{
  "annotation_id": "e874ee53-840a-450f-ad4e-a90b18b436c9",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:14.805000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:14.805000Z",
  "file_hash": "19fc18ce761d526424b5646245401c50c8938b68ce8701c07a79aa90f042a0e8",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical\nevolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among\nindividuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff\ncomputation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked\ninfluence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can\nbe established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the\npopulations and their evolutionary stability.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0612225",
    "authors": [
      "M. Tomassini",
      "L. Luthi",
      "E. Pestelacci"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1142/S0129183107011212",
    "title": "Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612225"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "90e1281d-cee7-431d-9cfb-77ce9dac533f",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}