{
  "annotation_id": "e6f866ad-2ecc-4ad5-9b8c-52fed02a3ca7",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:00:56.813000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:00:56.813000Z",
  "file_hash": "d51933c913553f1f86560c02b50fb86ac048e26be014f8d45c0825f2bb0cde13",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The abstract concept of indeterministic free will is distinguished from the\nphenomenon of free will. Evidence for the abstract concept is examined and\ncritically compared with various designs of automata. It is concluded that\nthere is no evidence to support the abstract concept of indeterministic free\nwill, it is inconceivable that a test could be constructed to distinguish an\nindeterministic agent from a complicated automaton. Testing the free will of an\nalien visitor is introduced to separate prejudices about who has free will from\nobjective experiments. The phenomenon of free will is modelled with a\ndeterministic decision making agent. The agent values independence and\nsatisfies a desire for independence by responding to challenges. When the agent\ngenerates challenges internally it will establish a record of being able to do\notherwise. In principle a computer could be built with a free will property.\nThe model also explains false attributions of free will (superstitions).",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0504215",
    "authors": [
      "Mark J Hadley"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.gen-ph"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "Journal of consciousness exploration and research (2018) vol 9 No\n  1",
    "license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
    "title": "Free Will and Physics",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0504215"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "cd152f9c-2d16-4df5-acb3-9c2a3e0b6063",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}