dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaProbability in the Everett World: Comments on Wallace and Greaves
| Authors | Huw Price |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0604191 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604191 |
Abstract
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can't make sense of probability at all, or it can't explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In particular, he has stressed its reliance on the distinguishing symmetry of the Everett view, viz., that all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as equally real. The argument thus tries to make a virtue of what has usually been seen as the main obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett world. In this note I outline some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace argument, and to related proposals by Hilary Greaves about the epistemology of Everettian QM. (In the latter case, my arguments include an appeal to an Everettian analogue of the Sleeping Beauty problem.) The common thread to these objections is that the symmetry in question remains a very significant obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett interpretation.
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"abstract": "It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make sense\nof quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can\u0027t make\nsense of probability at all, or it can\u0027t explain why probability should be\ngoverned by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these\nobjections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes\nsense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable\nassumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be\nconstrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has developed and defended\nDeutsch\u0027s proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In particular,\nhe has stressed its reliance on the distinguishing symmetry of the Everett\nview, viz., that all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as\nequally real. The argument thus tries to make a virtue of what has usually been\nseen as the main obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett world.\nIn this note I outline some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace argument, and to\nrelated proposals by Hilary Greaves about the epistemology of Everettian QM.\n(In the latter case, my arguments include an appeal to an Everettian analogue\nof the Sleeping Beauty problem.) The common thread to these objections is that\nthe symmetry in question remains a very significant obstacle to making sense of\nprobability in the Everett interpretation.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0604191",
"authors": [
"Huw Price"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"title": "Probability in the Everett World: Comments on Wallace and Greaves",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604191"
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