{
  "annotation_id": "e3fb5d4f-36f9-46ac-a288-d46f3b0e4d15",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:10.230000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:10.230000Z",
  "file_hash": "9177d3e513d514a34c30bdedb8d414b4480da9ba97601cfc481848fdfa488837",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The notion of simulatable security (reactive simulatability, universal\ncomposability) is a powerful tool for allowing the modular design of\ncryptographic protocols (composition of protocols) and showing the security of\na given protocol embedded in a larger one. Recently, these methods have\nreceived much attention in the quantum cryptographic community.\n  We give a short introduction to simulatable security in general and proceed\nby sketching the many different definitional choices together with their\nadvantages and disadvantages.\n  Based on the reactive simulatability modelling of Backes, Pfitzmann and\nWaidner we then develop a quantum security model. By following the BPW\nmodelling as closely as possible, we show that composable quantum security\ndefinitions for quantum protocols can strongly profit from their classical\ncounterparts, since most of the definitional choices in the modelling are\nindependent of the underlying machine model.\n  In particular, we give a proof for the simple composition theorem in our\nframework.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0409125",
    "authors": [
      "Dominique Unruh"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph",
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    "title": "Simulatable security for quantum protocols",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409125"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "eed0263d-3a30-45fe-93e5-a0104a3b733d",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}