{
  "annotation_id": "dfe99284-f54a-4b89-aaea-12c702f55afe",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.567000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.567000Z",
  "file_hash": "5a7080a9c71d001abcdf0ec59229efe765f1ecb1a28a57267596c2d347548454",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We present a new technique for proving the security of quantum key\ndistribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic\narguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification\nscheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of\nQKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to\nanalyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider\ncollective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the\nsecret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and\nwhich are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze\nthe BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocol with one-way error correction and\nprivacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is\nincreased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the\nerror correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more\nrobust against noise in the quantum channel.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0502064",
    "authors": [
      "R. Renner",
      "N. Gisin",
      "B. Kraus"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.72.012332",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 72, 012332 (2005)",
    "title": "An information-theoretic security proof for QKD protocols",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0502064"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "20a3f561-298d-4663-9f5e-cc5485daaab5",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}