{
  "annotation_id": "d59add85-523a-40ff-bcaf-41612491b333",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.276000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.276000Z",
  "file_hash": "f795e42cf2f98f89f92500aa5aaa775cf9eff27147ba1a5a799c2685552770c0",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Unconditional security proofs of the Bennett-Brassard protocol of quantum key\ndistribution have been obtained recently. These proofs cover also practical\nimplementations that utilize weak coherent pulses in the four signal\npolarizations. Proven secure rates leave open the possibility that new proofs\nor new public discussion protocols obtain larger rates over increased distance.\nIn this paper we investigate limits to error rate and signal losses that can be\ntolerated by future protocols and proofs.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0411041",
    "authors": [
      "Marcos Curty",
      "Norbert L\u00fctkenhaus"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.71.062301",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 71, 062301 (2005)",
    "title": "Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key   distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0411041"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b84f9355-39dc-4953-b777-d0b4acff6591",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}