{
  "annotation_id": "d40de5e3-b543-43bf-8601-81f35048e584",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:18.365000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:18.365000Z",
  "file_hash": "8dc3e66760a4c9fed84b5f662509dbf0a216f5d9c441ec8dc6cb3f61b13c9c80",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We study the dating market decision problem in which men and women repeatedly\ngo out on dates and learn about each other. We consider a model for the dating\nmarket that takes into account progressive mutual learning. This model consists\nof a repeated game in which agents gain an uncertain payoff from being matched\nwith a particular person on the other side of the market in each time period.\nPlayers have a list of preferred partners on the other set. The players that\nreach higher rank levels on the other set preferences list have also higher\nprobability to be accepted for dating. A question can be raised, as considered\nin this study: Can the less appreciated players do better? Two different kinds\nof dating game are combined \"a la Parrondo\" to foster the less attractive\nplayers. Optimism seems to be highly recommendable, especially for losers.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0703189",
    "authors": [
      "C. M. Arizmendi"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1063/1.2746718",
    "journal_ref": "AIP Conference Proceedings 913, p. 20 (2007)",
    "title": "Paradoxical Way for Losers in a Dating Game",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0703189"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "93f75f79-c9c3-4f17-90f0-c4b0392eed3d",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}