{
  "annotation_id": "d40332fb-1818-466f-b429-9753fa3f91d3",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:56.011000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:56.011000Z",
  "file_hash": "dfada231b6da8141a698789cbcfcc9c541d311a085aeed4876489ff22f163215",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against\nthe most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse\nimplementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite\nexhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The\neavesdropper (Eve) is supposed to have unlimited technological power while the\nhonest parties (Alice and Bob) use present day technology, in particular an\nattenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. They exploit\nthe nonorthogonality of quantum states for decreasing the information\naccessible to Eve in the multi-photon pulses accidentally produced by the\nimperfect source. An implementation of some of these protocols using present\nday technology allow for a secure key distribution up to distances of $\\sim$\n150 km. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is\nincluded as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon\nnumber splitting attacks.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0302037",
    "authors": [
      "Antonio Acin",
      "Nicolas Gisin",
      "Valerio Scarani"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.69.012309",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 69, 012309 (2004).",
    "title": "Coherent pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols   resistant to photon number splitting attacks",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0302037"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "cbab151e-16bc-49e0-beeb-68e2bc829b43",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}