dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaQuantum Decoys
| Authors | Pablo Arrighi |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0308050 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0308050 |
| Journal | Int. J. of Quantum Information, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2004), pp341-351 |
Abstract
Alice communicates with words drawn uniformly amongst $\{\ket{j}\}_{j=1..n}$, the canonical orthonormal basis. Sometimes however Alice interleaves quantum decoys $\{\frac{\ket{j}+i\ket{k}}{\sqrt{2}}\}$ between her messages. Such pairwise superpositions of possible words cannot be distinguished from the message words. Thus as malevolent Eve observes the quantum channel, she runs the risk of damaging the superpositions (by causing a collapse). At the receiving end honest Bob, whom we assume is warned of the quantum decoys' distribution, checks upon their integrity with a measurement. The present work establishes, in the case of individual attacks, the tradeoff between Eve's information gain (her chances, if a message word was sent, of guessing which) and the disturbance she induces (Bob's chances, if a quantum decoy was sent, to detect tampering). Besides secure channel protocols, quantum decoys seem a powerful primitive for constructing n-dimensional quantum cryptographic applications. Moreover the methods employed in this article should be of strong interest to anyone concerned with the old but fundamental problem of how much information may be gained about a system, versus how much this will disturb the system, in quantum mechanics. Keywords: d-level systems cryptography
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"abstract": "Alice communicates with words drawn uniformly amongst $\\{\\ket{j}\\}_{j=1..n}$,\nthe canonical orthonormal basis. Sometimes however Alice interleaves quantum\ndecoys $\\{\\frac{\\ket{j}+i\\ket{k}}{\\sqrt{2}}\\}$ between her messages. Such\npairwise superpositions of possible words cannot be distinguished from the\nmessage words. Thus as malevolent Eve observes the quantum channel, she runs\nthe risk of damaging the superpositions (by causing a collapse). At the\nreceiving end honest Bob, whom we assume is warned of the quantum decoys\u0027\ndistribution, checks upon their integrity with a measurement. The present work\nestablishes, in the case of individual attacks, the tradeoff between Eve\u0027s\ninformation gain (her chances, if a message word was sent, of guessing which)\nand the disturbance she induces (Bob\u0027s chances, if a quantum decoy was sent, to\ndetect tampering). Besides secure channel protocols, quantum decoys seem a\npowerful primitive for constructing n-dimensional quantum cryptographic\napplications. Moreover the methods employed in this article should be of strong\ninterest to anyone concerned with the old but fundamental problem of how much\ninformation may be gained about a system, versus how much this will disturb the\nsystem, in quantum mechanics. Keywords: d-level systems cryptography",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0308050",
"authors": [
"Pablo Arrighi"
],
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],
"journal_ref": "Int. J. of Quantum Information, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2004), pp341-351",
"title": "Quantum Decoys",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0308050"
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