dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaThe Vaccinee's Dilemma: Individual-level Decisions, Self- Organization & Influenza Epidemics
| Authors | Raffaele Vardavas, Romulus Breban, Sally Blower |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | q-bio/0610033 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0610033 |
Abstract
Inspired by Minority Games, we constructed a novel individual-level game of adaptive decision-making based on the dilemma of deciding whether to participate in voluntary influenza vaccination programs. The proportion of the population vaccinated (i.e., the vaccination coverage) determines epidemic severity. Above a critical vaccination coverage, epidemics are prevented; hence individuals find it unnecessary to vaccinate. The adaptive dynamics of the decisions directly affect influenza epidemiology and, conversely, influenza epidemiology strongly influences decision-making. This feedback mechanism creates a unique self-organized state where epidemics are prevented. This state is attracting, but unstable; thus epidemics are rarely prevented. This result implies that vaccination will have to be mandatory if the public health objective is to prevent influenza epidemics. We investigated how collective behavior changes when public health programs are implemented. Surprisingly, programs requiring advance payment for several years of vaccination prevents severe epidemics, even with voluntary vaccination. Prevention is determined by the individuals' adaptability, memory, and number of pre-paid vaccinations. Notably, vaccinating families exacerbates and increases the frequency of severe epidemics.
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"abstract": "Inspired by Minority Games, we constructed a novel individual-level game of\nadaptive decision-making based on the dilemma of deciding whether to\nparticipate in voluntary influenza vaccination programs. The proportion of the\npopulation vaccinated (i.e., the vaccination coverage) determines epidemic\nseverity. Above a critical vaccination coverage, epidemics are prevented; hence\nindividuals find it unnecessary to vaccinate. The adaptive dynamics of the\ndecisions directly affect influenza epidemiology and, conversely, influenza\nepidemiology strongly influences decision-making. This feedback mechanism\ncreates a unique self-organized state where epidemics are prevented. This state\nis attracting, but unstable; thus epidemics are rarely prevented. This result\nimplies that vaccination will have to be mandatory if the public health\nobjective is to prevent influenza epidemics. We investigated how collective\nbehavior changes when public health programs are implemented. Surprisingly,\nprograms requiring advance payment for several years of vaccination prevents\nsevere epidemics, even with voluntary vaccination. Prevention is determined by\nthe individuals\u0027 adaptability, memory, and number of pre-paid vaccinations.\nNotably, vaccinating families exacerbates and increases the frequency of severe\nepidemics.",
"arxiv_id": "q-bio/0610033",
"authors": [
"Raffaele Vardavas",
"Romulus Breban",
"Sally Blower"
],
"categories": [
"q-bio.PE"
],
"title": "The Vaccinee\u0027s Dilemma: Individual-level Decisions, Self- Organization \u0026 Influenza Epidemics",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0610033"
},
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