dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaA method of enciphering quantum states
| Authors | Hiroo Azuma, Masashi Ban |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0006124 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0006124 |
| DOI | 10.1088/0305-4470/34/13/305 |
| Journal | J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 34 (2001) 2723-2741 |
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a method of enciphering quantum states of two-state systems (qubits) for sending them in secrecy without entangled qubits shared by two legitimate users (Alice and Bob). This method has the following two properties. First, even if an eavesdropper (Eve) steals qubits, she can extract information from them with certain probability at most. Second, Alice and Bob can confirm that the qubits are transmitted between them correctly by measuring a signature. If Eve measures m qubits one by one from n enciphered qubits and sends alternative ones (the Intercept/Resend attack), a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's action is equal to (3/4)^m or less. Passwords for decryption and the signature are given by classical binary strings and they are disclosed through a public channel. Enciphering classical information by this method is equivalent to the one-time pad method with distributing a classical key (random binary string) by the BB84 protocol. If Eve takes away qubits, Alice and Bob lose the original quantum information. If we apply our method to a state in iteration, Eve's success probability decreases exponentially. We cannot examine security against the case that Eve makes an attack with using entanglement. This remains to be solved in the future.
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"abstract": "In this paper, we propose a method of enciphering quantum states of two-state\nsystems (qubits) for sending them in secrecy without entangled qubits shared by\ntwo legitimate users (Alice and Bob). This method has the following two\nproperties. First, even if an eavesdropper (Eve) steals qubits, she can extract\ninformation from them with certain probability at most. Second, Alice and Bob\ncan confirm that the qubits are transmitted between them correctly by measuring\na signature. If Eve measures m qubits one by one from n enciphered qubits and\nsends alternative ones (the Intercept/Resend attack), a probability that Alice\nand Bob do not notice Eve\u0027s action is equal to (3/4)^m or less. Passwords for\ndecryption and the signature are given by classical binary strings and they are\ndisclosed through a public channel. Enciphering classical information by this\nmethod is equivalent to the one-time pad method with distributing a classical\nkey (random binary string) by the BB84 protocol. If Eve takes away qubits,\nAlice and Bob lose the original quantum information. If we apply our method to\na state in iteration, Eve\u0027s success probability decreases exponentially. We\ncannot examine security against the case that Eve makes an attack with using\nentanglement. This remains to be solved in the future.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0006124",
"authors": [
"Hiroo Azuma",
"Masashi Ban"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1088/0305-4470/34/13/305",
"journal_ref": "J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 34 (2001) 2723-2741",
"title": "A method of enciphering quantum states",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0006124"
},
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