{
  "annotation_id": "cdbd5c64-2a08-45f5-a075-21ecf1253338",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:42.077000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:42.077000Z",
  "file_hash": "91a09e59b4acc121b443270008ec60b03256befe49ab4f6d266f7f8fbe1d30da",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The technological possibilities of a realistic eavesdropper are discussed.\nTwo eavesdropping strategies taking profit of multiphoton pulses in faint laser\nQKD are presented. We conclude that, as long as storage of Qubits is\ntechnically impossible, faint laser QKD is not limited by this security issue,\nbut mostly by the detector noise.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0102062",
    "authors": [
      "Stephane Felix",
      "Nicolas Gisin",
      "Andre Stefanov",
      "Hugo Zbinden"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1080/09500340108240903",
    "title": "Faint laser quantum key distribution: Eavesdropping exploiting   multiphoton pulses",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0102062"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "6f6e330f-c605-4877-86eb-a51d08842ad8",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}