{
  "annotation_id": "cda23994-fb90-47f8-8b3c-01c785f69919",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:42.572000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:42.572000Z",
  "file_hash": "26305390820c0da178ec898dff035c80b8c8cc968da5bac1cbb4eaa6330a69b6",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners (NQSS) are key\ndistribution protocols in which Alice encodes her key into $N-1$ qubits, in\nsuch a way that all the other partners must cooperate in order to retrieve the\nkey. On these protocols, several eavesdropping scenarios are possible: some\npartners may want to reconstruct the key without the help of the other ones,\nand consequently collaborate with an Eve that eavesdrops on the other partners\u0027\nchannels. For each of these scenarios, we give the optimal individual attack\nthat the Eve can perform. In case of such an optimal attack, the authorized\npartners have a higher information on the key than the unauthorized ones if and\nonly if they can violate a Bell\u0027s inequality.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0104016",
    "authors": [
      "Valerio Scarani",
      "Nicolas Gisin"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.65.012311",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A, 65 (2002) 012311",
    "title": "Quantum Key Distribution between N partners: optimal eavesdropping and   Bell\u0027s inequalities",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104016"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "5ef13113-9c20-4fae-9ff7-ab000db047cf",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}