{
  "annotation_id": "cbc09805-f8b9-4f99-bd9b-f6ede6d9cdc7",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.619000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.619000Z",
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  "record": {
    "abstract": "In a comparison of the principles of special relativity and of quantum\nmechanics, the former theory is marked by its relative economy and apparent\nexplanatory simplicity. A number of theorists have thus been led to search for\na small number of postulates - essentially information theoretic in nature -\nthat would play the role in quantum mechanics that the relativity principle and\nthe light postulate jointly play in Einstein\u0027s 1905 special relativity theory.\nThe purpose of the present paper is to resist this idea, at least in so far as\nit is supposed to reveal the fundamental form of the theory. It is argued that\nthe methodology of Einstein\u0027s 1905 theory represents a victory of pragmatism\nover explanatory depth; and that its adoption only made sense in the context of\nthe chaotic state state of physics at the start of the 20th century - as\nEinstein well knew.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0601182",
    "authors": [
      "Harvey R. Brown",
      "Christopher G. Timpson"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "Physical Theory and its Interpretation, W. Demopoulos and I.\n  Pitowsky (eds.) Springer 2006",
    "title": "Why special relativity should not be a template for a fundamental   reformulation of quantum mechanics",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0601182"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b3240b6d-61ef-4a55-bcfa-9c00f9213eb1",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}