{
  "annotation_id": "c05577eb-c706-4681-b323-40a877eef816",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:27.284000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:27.284000Z",
  "file_hash": "4188b87285edda813d7a2eca08063288e857757308e665e2cef24dad2f47863d",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key\ndistribution via quantum encryption protocol [$\\text{Phys. Rev. A} \\textbf{64},\n24302 (2001)$] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve\u0027s attacks and\nwith the probability one half she gets all of keys without being detected by\nthe two parties. The main defect in this protocol is that there is an attack\nstrategy by which Eve can change the previously shared Bell state between Alice\nand Bob to two Bell states among herself and Alice and Bob. Hence, we show that\nwith probability $1/d$ its generalization to $d$-dimension systems is not\nsecure and show that its extension to the case of more partners based on the\nreusable GHZ states is not secure and with probability one half Eve gets all of\nkeys without being detected by the two parties. In what follows, we show how in\ngoing to higher dimensions those protocols can be repaired.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0604185",
    "authors": [
      "A. Fahmi"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "New Approach to Quantum Key Distribution Via Quantum Encryption",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604185"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b27d36f9-94db-4d21-b56b-729d8deb0999",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}