{
  "annotation_id": "bf1645d1-a06c-4ff9-8039-a42efe7da87d",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.174000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.174000Z",
  "file_hash": "0c237b857dc608597f1f2f1ef7341f450c3714216f14c30a1cd5ddf791a0a748",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole\nclass of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard\nassumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root\nmeasurement is optimal for eavesdropping purposes, is not true in general.\nThere are rather large parameter regimes in which the optimal measurement\nextracts substantially more information than the square-root measurement.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0310144",
    "authors": [
      "Dagomir Kaszlikowski",
      "Ajay Gopinathan",
      "Yeong Cherng Liang",
      "L. C. Kwek",
      "Berthold-Georg Englert"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.70.032306",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review A, vol. 70, art. 032306 (5 pages) (2004)",
    "title": "Quantum Cryptography: Security Criteria Reexamined",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310144"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b8860b40-17c6-4168-b9db-4022deef10be",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}