dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaQuantum memory in quantum cryptography
| Authors | Tal Mor |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/9906073 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906073 |
Abstract
[Shortened abstract:] This thesis investigates the importance of quantum memory in quantum cryptography, concentrating on quantum key distribution schemes. In the hands of an eavesdropper -- a quantum memory is a powerful tool, putting in question the security of quantum cryptography; Classical privacy amplification techniques, used to prove security against less powerful eavesdroppers, might not be effective when the eavesdropper can keep quantum states for a long time. In this work we suggest a possible direction for approaching this problem. We define strong attacks of this type, and show security against them, suggesting that quantum cryptography is secure. We start with a complete analysis regarding the information about a parity bit (since parity bits are used for privacy amplification). We use the results regarding the information on parity bits to prove security against very strong eavesdropping attacks, which uses quantum memories and all classical data (including error correction codes) to attack the final key directly. In the hands of the legitimate users, a quantum memory is also a useful tool. We suggest a new type of quantum key distribution scheme where quantum memories are used instead of quantum channels. This scheme is especially adequate for networks of many users. The use of quantum memory also allows reducing the error rate to improve large scale quantum cryptography, and to enable the legitimate users to work with reasonable error rate.
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"abstract": "[Shortened abstract:] This thesis investigates the importance of quantum\nmemory in quantum cryptography, concentrating on quantum key distribution\nschemes.\n In the hands of an eavesdropper -- a quantum memory is a powerful tool,\nputting in question the security of quantum cryptography; Classical privacy\namplification techniques, used to prove security against less powerful\neavesdroppers, might not be effective when the eavesdropper can keep quantum\nstates for a long time. In this work we suggest a possible direction for\napproaching this problem. We define strong attacks of this type, and show\nsecurity against them, suggesting that quantum cryptography is secure. We start\nwith a complete analysis regarding the information about a parity bit (since\nparity bits are used for privacy amplification). We use the results regarding\nthe information on parity bits to prove security against very strong\neavesdropping attacks, which uses quantum memories and all classical data\n(including error correction codes) to attack the final key directly.\n In the hands of the legitimate users, a quantum memory is also a useful tool.\nWe suggest a new type of quantum key distribution scheme where quantum memories\nare used instead of quantum channels. This scheme is especially adequate for\nnetworks of many users. The use of quantum memory also allows reducing the\nerror rate to improve large scale quantum cryptography, and to enable the\nlegitimate users to work with reasonable error rate.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9906073",
"authors": [
"Tal Mor"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"title": "Quantum memory in quantum cryptography",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906073"
},
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