dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaHow to reuse a one-time pad and other notes on authentication, encryption and protection of quantum information
| Authors | Jonathan Oppenheim, Michal Horodecki |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0306161 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0306161 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevA.72.042309 |
| Journal | Phys. Rev. A 72, 042309 (2005) |
Abstract
Quantum information is a valuable resource which can be encrypted in order to protect it. We consider the size of the one-time pad that is needed to protect quantum information in a number of cases. The situation is dramatically different from the classical case: we prove that one can recycle the one-time pad without compromising security. The protocol for recycling relies on detecting whether eavesdropping has occurred, and further relies on the fact that information contained in the encrypted quantum state cannot be fully accessed. We prove the security of recycling rates when authentication of quantum states is accepted, and when it is rejected. We note that recycling schemes respect a general law of cryptography which we prove relating the size of private keys, sent qubits, and encrypted messages. We discuss applications for encryption of quantum information in light of the resources needed for teleportation. Potential uses include the protection of resources such as entanglement and the memory of quantum computers. We also introduce another application: encrypted secret sharing and find that one can even reuse the private key that is used to encrypt a classical message. In a number of cases, one finds that the amount of private key needed for authentication or protection is smaller than in the general case.
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"abstract": "Quantum information is a valuable resource which can be encrypted in order to\nprotect it. We consider the size of the one-time pad that is needed to protect\nquantum information in a number of cases. The situation is dramatically\ndifferent from the classical case: we prove that one can recycle the one-time\npad without compromising security. The protocol for recycling relies on\ndetecting whether eavesdropping has occurred, and further relies on the fact\nthat information contained in the encrypted quantum state cannot be fully\naccessed. We prove the security of recycling rates when authentication of\nquantum states is accepted, and when it is rejected. We note that recycling\nschemes respect a general law of cryptography which we prove relating the size\nof private keys, sent qubits, and encrypted messages. We discuss applications\nfor encryption of quantum information in light of the resources needed for\nteleportation. Potential uses include the protection of resources such as\nentanglement and the memory of quantum computers. We also introduce another\napplication: encrypted secret sharing and find that one can even reuse the\nprivate key that is used to encrypt a classical message. In a number of cases,\none finds that the amount of private key needed for authentication or\nprotection is smaller than in the general case.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0306161",
"authors": [
"Jonathan Oppenheim",
"Michal Horodecki"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph",
"cs.CR"
],
"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.72.042309",
"journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 72, 042309 (2005)",
"title": "How to reuse a one-time pad and other notes on authentication, encryption and protection of quantum information",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0306161"
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