{
  "annotation_id": "b301bd19-ad5e-43ec-8c78-bec4e81c02f1",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.636000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.636000Z",
  "file_hash": "878b94a46c65474010af4ec371e3049feada736c3778cac1c71ec3686e36e680",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols\nusing one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven\nby considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper\nbounds on the secret key rate of those QKD protocol involving only entropies of\ntwo--qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine\nnew bounds for the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocol. We show that in\nall these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners\nshould apply consists in adding noise. This is precisely why any entanglement\nbased proof would generally fail here.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0410215",
    "authors": [
      "B. Kraus",
      "N. Gisin",
      "R. Renner"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.080501",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005)",
    "title": "Lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate for QKD protocols using   one--way classical communication",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410215"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "78db785d-8b6c-4e7b-9902-98a7247eef90",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}