{
  "annotation_id": "a746a490-c66f-4620-81b4-08c859e024c9",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.322000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.322000Z",
  "file_hash": "51943bd9f7145088b7a2d3164a10e4215de61ab92d3f291578b1fdf7fa821369",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "It is known that statistical predictions of quantum theory do not depend on\nits interpretation. In particular, an experiment cannot distinguish between the\nCopenhagen interpretation (involving no hidden variables) and the de\nBroglie-Bohm interpretation based on nonlocal hidden variables. Quantum\ncryptographic protocols, such as BB84 or E91, are secure and mutually\nequivalent as long as one works within the framework of Copenhagen\ninterpretation. But they are inequivalent and insecure if one considers attacks\nallowed by the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. The fundametal problem of\nquantum cryptography is therefore this: Are all the statements about security\nof quantum protocols based on our belief in one of the two allowed\ninterpretations of quantum mechanics? We show that this is not the case.\nEkert-type protocols can be modified in a way that makes them secure even if\nthe de Broglie-Bohm nonlocal hidden variables exist. Bennett-Brassard-type\ncryptography does not seem to allow for such a correction.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0412058",
    "authors": [
      "Marcin Pawlowski",
      "Marek Czachor"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "The fundamental problem of quantum cryptography",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412058"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "17bea0a5-0395-4a86-9162-fda6daa04cd1",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}