dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaDynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
| Authors | J. Gomez-Gardenes, M. Campillo, L. M. Floria, Y. Moreno |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0612108 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612108 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103 |
| Journal | Physical Review Letters 98, 108103 (2007) |
Abstract
In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate ({\em pure cooperators}), always defect ({\em pure defectors}) and those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact the size of the latter set is the biggest for a wide range of the "stimulus to defect" parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is favored.
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"abstract": "In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies\nby analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma,\na two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation,\nwhose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the\npopulation is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate\n({\\em pure cooperators}), always defect ({\\em pure defectors}) and those that\nintermittently change their strategy. In fact the size of the latter set is the\nbiggest for a wide range of the \"stimulus to defect\" parameter. While in\nhomogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters,\nin heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster\ncontaining the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further\ninsights into why cooperation in SF networks is favored.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0612108",
"authors": [
"J. Gomez-Gardenes",
"M. Campillo",
"L. M. Floria",
"Y. Moreno"
],
"categories": [
"physics.soc-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103",
"journal_ref": "Physical Review Letters 98, 108103 (2007)",
"title": "Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612108"
},
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