{
  "annotation_id": "a6bc8305-6f49-40cd-ae6e-c6c9d0cfe4c7",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:14.419000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:14.419000Z",
  "file_hash": "6d76d0b0ac1fc77acddeb3bf0eef52406af84ae99e024646ff4a5d9c25bbe159",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies\nby analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma,\na two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation,\nwhose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the\npopulation is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate\n({\\em pure cooperators}), always defect ({\\em pure defectors}) and those that\nintermittently change their strategy. In fact the size of the latter set is the\nbiggest for a wide range of the \"stimulus to defect\" parameter. While in\nhomogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters,\nin heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster\ncontaining the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further\ninsights into why cooperation in SF networks is favored.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0612108",
    "authors": [
      "J. Gomez-Gardenes",
      "M. Campillo",
      "L. M. Floria",
      "Y. Moreno"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review Letters 98, 108103 (2007)",
    "title": "Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612108"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "5218dc20-82ae-4118-a6e7-b8895f5b217d",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}