{
  "annotation_id": "a566bcd3-1a15-4667-91e9-2457050f113f",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:10.278000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:10.278000Z",
  "file_hash": "4322dc3c89976fb702d498b546c42f16a043c68f2d64eaa6be92dcbb00dea1d2",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The new orthodoxy of quantum mechanics (QM) based on the decoherence approach\nrequires many-worlds as an essential ingredient for logical consistency, and\none may wonder what status to give to all these \"other worlds\". Here we\nadvocate that it is possible to build a consistent approach to QM where no\nother worlds are needed, and where the quantum formalism appears as a\nconsequence of requiring the enumerability of physical properties. Such a\nquantization hypothesis is closely related to indistinguishability, and is\ndeeply inconsistent with classical physics.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0407025",
    "authors": [
      "Philippe Grangier"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Contextual objectivity and the quantum formalism",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407025"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c1492a98-fbcc-4976-9327-b876a1802d8a",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}