{
  "annotation_id": "a32a3b70-ac9d-4ce8-91dc-3eec5b21617a",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.740000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.740000Z",
  "file_hash": "8cbb3ae8cb0cdbe56549b68c15ed79c672cb916179f8d68df1cf1fe551a3d9fb",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "There has been much interest in quantum key distribution. Experimentally,\nquantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers has been\nsuccessfully performed. The crucial issue in quantum key distribution is its\nsecurity. Unfortunately, all recent experiments are, in principle, insecure due\nto real-life imperfections. Here, we propose a method that can for the first\ntime make most of those experiments secure by using essentially the same\nhardware. Our method is to use decoy states to detect eavesdropping attacks. As\na consequence, we have the best of both worlds--enjoying unconditional security\nguaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics and yet dramatically surpassing\neven some of the best experimental performances reported in the literature.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0411004",
    "authors": [
      "Hoi-Kwong Lo",
      "Xiongfeng Ma",
      "Kai Chen"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230504",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review Letters, 94 (2005) 230504",
    "title": "Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0411004"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "f3283ae8-e44b-4d30-83c6-5ffe666942fb",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}