{
  "annotation_id": "9f55e4ba-d297-4ad9-9d1f-79553ca128fc",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:04.187000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:04.187000Z",
  "file_hash": "df85c322ab4cdfc738eec58a98a1a3417619768450b3dfdd5875b49b4d8d45f9",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We consider ghetto as a community of people ruled against their will by an\nexternal power. Members of the community feel that their laws are broken.\nHowever, attempts to leave ghetto makes their situation worse. We discuss the\nrelation of the ghetto inhabitants to the ruling power in context of their\nneeds, organized according to the Maslow hierarchy. Decisions how to satisfy\nsuccessive needs are undertaken in cooperation with or defection the ruling\npower. This issue allows to construct the tree of decisions and to adopt the\npruning technique from the game theory. Dynamics of decisions can be described\nwithin the formalism of fundamental equations. The result is that the strategy\nof defection is stabilized by the estimated payoff.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0512058",
    "authors": [
      "Krzysztof Kulakowski"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1142/S0129183106009151",
    "journal_ref": "Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 17 (2006) 287",
    "title": "Cooperation and defection in ghetto",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512058"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "5e13f036-d31d-4567-b45a-ff575b058448",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}