dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaSecurity against eavesdropping in quantum cryptography
| Authors | N. Lütkenhaus, Stephen M. Barnett |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/9711033 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9711033 |
| Journal | Proceedings of an International Workshop on Quantum Communication, Computing, and Measurement, held September 25-30 1996 in Shizuoka, Japan, Plenum Press, New York (1997) |
Abstract
In this article we deal with the security of the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol over noisy channels using generalized privacy amplification. For this we estimate the fraction of bits needed to be discarded during the privacy amplification step. This estimate is given for two scenarios, both of which assume the eavesdropper to access each of the signals independently and take error correction into account. One scenario does not allow a delay of the eavesdropper's measurement of a measurement probe until he receives additional classical information. In this scenario we achieve a sharp bound. The other scenario allows a measurement delay, so that the general attack of an eavesdropper on individual signals is covered. This bound is not sharp but allows a practical implementation of the protocol.
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"abstract": "In this article we deal with the security of the BB84 quantum cryptography\nprotocol over noisy channels using generalized privacy amplification. For this\nwe estimate the fraction of bits needed to be discarded during the privacy\namplification step. This estimate is given for two scenarios, both of which\nassume the eavesdropper to access each of the signals independently and take\nerror correction into account. One scenario does not allow a delay of the\neavesdropper\u0027s measurement of a measurement probe until he receives additional\nclassical information. In this scenario we achieve a sharp bound. The other\nscenario allows a measurement delay, so that the general attack of an\neavesdropper on individual signals is covered. This bound is not sharp but\nallows a practical implementation of the protocol.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9711033",
"authors": [
"N. L\u00fctkenhaus",
"Stephen M. Barnett"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"journal_ref": "Proceedings of an International Workshop on Quantum Communication,\n Computing, and Measurement, held September 25-30 1996 in Shizuoka, Japan,\n Plenum Press, New York (1997)",
"title": "Security against eavesdropping in quantum cryptography",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9711033"
},
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