dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaSecurity of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution against individual attack over a realistic channel
| Authors | Kiyoshi Tamaki, Masato Koashi, Nobuyuki Imoto |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0212161 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212161 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevA.67.032310 |
| Journal | Phys. Rev. A 67, 032310 (2003) |
Abstract
The security of two-state quantum key distribution against individual attack is estimated when the channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and Bob use two nonorthogonal single-photon polarization states. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice and Bob make use of inconclusive results and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of received states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters which reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve's disturbance. In some parameter regions, Eve's maximum information gain shows counter-intuitive behavior, namely, it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate Eve can extract perfect information in the case where the angle between Alice's two states is small or large, while she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate angles. We also estimate the secret key gain which is the net growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.
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"abstract": "The security of two-state quantum key distribution against individual attack\nis estimated when the channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and\nBob use two nonorthogonal single-photon polarization states. To make our\nanalysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice and Bob make\nuse of inconclusive results and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of\nreceived states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve\u0027s\ninformation gain as a function of a few parameters which reflect the\nimperfections of devices or Eve\u0027s disturbance. In some parameter regions, Eve\u0027s\nmaximum information gain shows counter-intuitive behavior, namely, it decreases\nas the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate Eve can extract\nperfect information in the case where the angle between Alice\u0027s two states is\nsmall or large, while she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate\nangles. We also estimate the secret key gain which is the net growth of the\nsecret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol\nover a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0212161",
"authors": [
"Kiyoshi Tamaki",
"Masato Koashi",
"Nobuyuki Imoto"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.67.032310",
"journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 67, 032310 (2003)",
"title": "Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution against individual attack over a realistic channel",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212161"
},
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