{
  "annotation_id": "946b315e-504a-4a56-a40c-a4fcf9d14aec",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.053000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.053000Z",
  "file_hash": "30d7d2ff4ec91977d3ddfe91db5537582698e09d2686374688b0975ccb04d4f1",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "In a recent Letter (Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 010503) Barrett, Hardy and\nKent (BHK) considered a very interesting question which of the fundamental laws\nof physics ensure security of quantum cryptographic protocols. In particular,\nthey presented quantum key distribution protocol and claimed its security in a\nvery general framework, which allows - what they call - postquantum\neavesdropping strategies i.e. which \"allows for eavesdroppers who can break the\nlaws of quantum mechanics, as long as nothing they can do implies the\npossibility of superluminal signaling\". In this Comment, however, we show that\nit is still possible to construct a strategy, which although consistent with\nall asumptions explicitely stated in BHK paper, enables perfect eavesdropping\nin their protocol.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0507100",
    "authors": [
      "Antoni Wojcik"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0507100"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "697222fb-a74d-4a41-bf79-d2d858893c44",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}