{
  "annotation_id": "927c4c43-1757-409c-b07e-704637e7bf25",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:00:42.152000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:00:42.152000Z",
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  "record": {
    "abstract": "Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In\nthese evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous\nasymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0210125",
    "authors": [
      "Kenton K. Yee"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.bio-ph",
      "cs.GT",
      "nlin.AO",
      "nlin.CG",
      "physics.soc-ph",
      "q-bio.PE"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.\n  183-197, 2003",
    "title": "Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "6a8850ad-8dfd-45f8-a0dd-b9875f246f4b",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}