dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaOwnership and Trade from Evolutionary Games
| Authors | Kenton K. Yee |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0210125 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125 |
| Journal | International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003 |
Abstract
Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.
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"abstract": "Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In\nthese evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous\nasymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0210125",
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"Kenton K. Yee"
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"journal_ref": "International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.\n 183-197, 2003",
"title": "Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125"
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