dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaExploiting the randomness of the measurement basis in quantum cryptography: Secure Quantum Key Growing without Privacy Amplification
| Authors | Hannes R. Böhm, Paul S. Böhm, Markus Aspelmeyer, Časlav Brukner, Anton Zeilinger |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0408179 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0408179 |
Abstract
We suggest that the randomness of the choices of measurement basis by Alice and Bob provides an additional important resource for quantum cryptography. As a specific application, we present a novel protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) which enhances the BB84 scheme by encrypting the information sent over the classical channel during key sifting. We show that, in the limit of long keys, this process prevents an eavesdropper from reproducing the sifting process carried out by the legitimate users. The inability of the eavesdropper to sift the information gathered by tapping the quantum channel reduces the amount of information that an eavesdropper can gain on the sifted key. We further show that the protocol proposed is self sustaining, and thus allows the growing of a secret key.
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"date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.387000Z",
"date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.387000Z",
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"abstract": "We suggest that the randomness of the choices of measurement basis by Alice\nand Bob provides an additional important resource for quantum cryptography. As\na specific application, we present a novel protocol for quantum key\ndistribution (QKD) which enhances the BB84 scheme by encrypting the information\nsent over the classical channel during key sifting. We show that, in the limit\nof long keys, this process prevents an eavesdropper from reproducing the\nsifting process carried out by the legitimate users. The inability of the\neavesdropper to sift the information gathered by tapping the quantum channel\nreduces the amount of information that an eavesdropper can gain on the sifted\nkey. We further show that the protocol proposed is self sustaining, and thus\nallows the growing of a secret key.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0408179",
"authors": [
"Hannes R. B\u00f6hm",
"Paul S. B\u00f6hm",
"Markus Aspelmeyer",
"\u010caslav Brukner",
"Anton Zeilinger"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"title": "Exploiting the randomness of the measurement basis in quantum cryptography: Secure Quantum Key Growing without Privacy Amplification",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0408179"
},
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