{
  "annotation_id": "8f00c45c-b10e-4a74-866c-63dc43b35bd2",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.524000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:03.524000Z",
  "file_hash": "a0d0b70f75e9b74d5927d5418d8d77a4301ad5d894f3edfd2a67ac1768b14d00",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be\nunconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon\nsignals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to\nthe loss in the quantum channel (e.g. loss in the optical fiber) and in the\nsingle-photon counters of the receivers. One can argue that the loss in the\ndetectors cannot be changed by an eavesdropper in order to increase the covered\ndistance. Here we show that the security analysis of this scenario is not as\neasy as is commonly assumed, since already two-photon processes allow\neavesdropping strategies that outperform the known photon-number splitting\nattack. For this reason there is, so far, no satisfactory security analysis\navailable in the framework of individual attacks.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0311066",
    "authors": [
      "Marcos Curty",
      "Norbert L\u00fctkenhaus"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.69.042321",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 69, 042321 (2004)",
    "title": "Practical quantum key distribution: On the security evaluation with   inefficient single-photon detectors",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0311066"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "85721ada-0dd2-4578-a714-fa6a3a0d9bc3",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}