dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaEquilibrium transitions in finite populations of players
| Authors | Jacek Miekisz |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | q-bio/0412038 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412038 |
Abstract
We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.
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"abstract": "We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing\ngames. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run\nbehavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the\ncase of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of\nplayers increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its\nequilibria.",
"arxiv_id": "q-bio/0412038",
"authors": [
"Jacek Miekisz"
],
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"title": "Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412038"
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