{
  "annotation_id": "819288c6-3e1b-40b9-a99d-36d390634133",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.211000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.211000Z",
  "file_hash": "aa2065e5424c27995390e18ebccf7c0a62a37e720e2ef13f2a1347e3a6510846",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are\nanalyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today\u0027s technology and\nconclude that all system must implement active counter-measures. In particular\nall systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming\nlight. We show that such counter-measures can be efficient, provided enough\nadditional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical\nway to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using\nTrojan horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the 2-way {\\it\nPlug-\u0026-Play} system to those of the standard 1-way systems.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0507063",
    "authors": [
      "N. Gisin",
      "S. Fasel",
      "B. Kraus",
      "H. Zbinden",
      "G. Ribordy"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.73.022320",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review A 73, 022320-1/6, 2006",
    "title": "Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0507063"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "122c8197-aa73-4550-9db2-d1db1718441e",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}