{
  "annotation_id": "7f3aa521-5794-4b0e-9a13-0ea82ec1a11a",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:02.810000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:02.810000Z",
  "file_hash": "96563923f6d59c37c7c06cc6732b5d80cff051dc3073d01c02f77ddb46d07ede",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We suggest here a two-point eavesdropping strategy to two nonorthogonal\nstates protocol of quantum key distribution over a fiber-optic channel. Suppose\nthat the single-photon sources and detectors of Alice, Bob and Eves are ideal\nones, the two-point attack can break the two nonorthogonal states protocol if\nthe distance between Alice and Bob is sufficiently long. For single-photon type\nB92 protocol, the upper bound of distance is about 30 kilometers. It is\ninteresting that Bennett\u0027s original multi-photon protocol is secure against\nboth two-point attack and beam splitting attack, even if the protocol is\nrealized with weak pulse source.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0310080",
    "authors": [
      "Li Yang",
      "Ling-An Wu"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Two-Point Attack on the Two Nonorthogonal State QKD Protocol over a   Fiber-Optic Channel",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310080"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "baf85331-a6d4-4021-bc82-5877caca8646",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}