{
  "annotation_id": "7f06488d-82e1-4b50-a602-c5c5127d42a4",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.280000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.280000Z",
  "file_hash": "3c7a3be38da5631dae6d69f46820b01de9cdd7b781138ec9f95a6e508f84fd2b",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "A bit string commitment protocol securely commits $N$ classical bits in such\na way that the recipient can extract only $M\u003cN$ bits of information about the\nstring. Classical reasoning might suggest that bit string commitment implies\nbit commitment and hence, given the Mayers-Lo-Chau theorem, that\nnon-relativistic quantum bit string commitment is impossible. Not so: there\nexist non-relativistic quantum bit string commitment protocols, with security\nparameters $\\epsilon$ and $M$, that allow $A$ to commit $N = N(M, \\epsilon)$\nbits to $B$ so that $A$\u0027s probability of successfully cheating when revealing\nany bit and $B$\u0027s probability of extracting more than $N\u0027=N-M$ bits of\ninformation about the $N$ bit string before revelation are both less than\n$\\epsilon$. With a slightly weakened but still restrictive definition of\nsecurity against $A$, $N$ can be taken to be $O(\\exp (C N\u0027))$ for a positive\nconstant $C$. I briefly discuss possible applications.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0111099",
    "authors": [
      "Adrian Kent"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph",
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.237901",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 237901 (2003)",
    "title": "Quantum Bit String Commitment",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0111099"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "9a0d91e1-95b5-4647-b71a-4764874c3ce2",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}