{
  "annotation_id": "773128a9-585b-4808-ba01-9201e7c13667",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.276000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:48.276000Z",
  "file_hash": "d4ad7c26c18a815fc523896272031dfdcc8ac3e19caa3ce3e6bca5d6e18d5c6c",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which\narise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process or exchange\ninformation. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography\ncan be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general\nsecure multi-party computations can be built.\n  The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems,\nwhich rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for\noblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems\napply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints into\naccount. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols\ncomputationally secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for\nbuilding a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other\nmistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing protocol. No\nsecurity proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might\nresist quantum computational attack.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0111097",
    "authors": [
      "Adrian Kent"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph",
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.68.012312",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 68, 012312 (2003).",
    "title": "A proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0111097"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "fbd8f4eb-7778-4d8e-be22-76c38dc9a8d8",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}