dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaPrisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks under perfect rationality
| Authors | Christoly Biely, Klaus Dragosits, Stefan Thurner |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0504190 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0504190 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.physd.2007.02.004 |
| Journal | Physica D 228 (2007), pp 40-48 |
Abstract
We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players. Individual decisions are made fully rationally and are based on local information only. They are made such that links to defecting agents are resolved and that cooperating agents build up new links. The exact form of the updating scheme is motivated by profit maximization and not by imitation. If players update their decisions in a synchronized way the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics: Periods of growing cooperation (and total linkage) alternate with periods of increasing defection. The cyclical behavior is reduced and the system stabilizes at significant total cooperation levels when players are less synchronized. In this regime we find emergent network structures resembling 'complex' and hierarchical topology. The exponent of the power-law degree distribution ($\gamma\sim8.6$) perfectly matches empirical results of human communication networks.
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"abstract": "We consider the prisoner\u0027s dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic\nnetwork, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players.\nThis leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the\nplayers. Individual decisions are made fully rationally and are based on local\ninformation only. They are made such that links to defecting agents are\nresolved and that cooperating agents build up new links. The exact form of the\nupdating scheme is motivated by profit maximization and not by imitation. If\nplayers update their decisions in a synchronized way the system exhibits\noscillatory dynamics: Periods of growing cooperation (and total linkage)\nalternate with periods of increasing defection. The cyclical behavior is\nreduced and the system stabilizes at significant total cooperation levels when\nplayers are less synchronized. In this regime we find emergent network\nstructures resembling \u0027complex\u0027 and hierarchical topology. The exponent of the\npower-law degree distribution ($\\gamma\\sim8.6$) perfectly matches empirical\nresults of human communication networks.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0504190",
"authors": [
"Christoly Biely",
"Klaus Dragosits",
"Stefan Thurner"
],
"categories": [
"physics.soc-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1016/j.physd.2007.02.004",
"journal_ref": "Physica D 228 (2007), pp 40-48",
"title": "Prisoner\u0027s dilemma on dynamic networks under perfect rationality",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0504190"
},
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