dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaQuantum Bit Escrow
| Authors | Dorit Aharonov, Amnon Ta-Shma, Umesh Vazirani, Andrew Yao |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0004017 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0004017 |
Abstract
Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - {\em quantum bit escrow}. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit $b$ to Bob. The commitment is {\em binding} in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of being detected cheating. The commitment is {\em sealing} in the sense that if Bob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow protocol. A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin flipping protocol where no player can control the game, i.e., even an all-powerful cheating player must lose with some constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast to the classical world where such protocols are impossible.
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"abstract": "Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be\nimpossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible\nalso in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - {\\em quantum\nbit escrow}. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit $b$ to Bob. The\ncommitment is {\\em binding} in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the\nbit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of\nbeing detected cheating. The commitment is {\\em sealing} in the sense that if\nBob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to\nprove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability.\nRigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has\nproved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative\nstatements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow\nprotocol.\n A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin flipping protocol\nwhere no player can control the game, i.e., even an all-powerful cheating\nplayer must lose with some constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast\nto the classical world where such protocols are impossible.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0004017",
"authors": [
"Dorit Aharonov",
"Amnon Ta-Shma",
"Umesh Vazirani",
"Andrew Yao"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"title": "Quantum Bit Escrow",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0004017"
},
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