{
  "annotation_id": "74fdffd1-3ffa-4cd5-ae53-5f011a07ca39",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:32.283000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:32.283000Z",
  "file_hash": "3d5f9e79448e655a3a20e085a4c39a6c42975e9b5c5633929513315b4bad7512",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay.\nIn the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average\npayoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model,\nnew players are born from parents who played in the past. We consider\ntwo-player games with two strategies and a unique mixed evolutionarily stable\nstrategy. We show that in the first type of dynamics, it is asymptotically\nstable for small time delays and becomes unstable for big ones when the\npopulation oscillates around its stationary state. In the second type of\ndynamics, however, evolutionarily stable strategy is asymptotically stable for\nany size of a time delay.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0409024",
    "authors": [
      "Jan Alboszta",
      "Jacek Miekisz"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "J. Theor. Biol. 231: 175-179 (2004)",
    "title": "Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator   dynamics with time delay",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409024"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "60457aff-b1f1-41f7-8594-27d2fd47b960",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}