{
  "annotation_id": "748776c5-f02d-40db-9fba-b8f1eef687a8",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:12.854000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:12.854000Z",
  "file_hash": "69a23e3b39ae75db1101ce0a5e94e4cab864c92b820f220380b90b15142da1d9",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two\ndistant parties. Of concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially\nstrong photon number splitting attack by an eavesdropper, but the decoy state\nmethod can detect this attack with current technology, yielding a high rate of\nsecret bits. In this Letter, we develop rigorous security statements in the\ncase of finite statistics with only a few decoy states, and we present the\nresults of simulations of an experimental setup of a decoy state protocol that\ncan be simply realized with current technology.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0503002",
    "authors": [
      "Jim W. Harrington",
      "J. Mark Ettinger",
      "Richard J. Hughes",
      "Jane E. Nordholt"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Enhancing practical security of quantum key distribution with a few   decoy states",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503002"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "14c9037f-858d-4e26-9510-65ea643a6401",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}