dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaPromotion of cooperation induced by the interplay between structure and game dynamics
| Authors | Feng Fu, Xiaojie Chen, Lianghuan Liu, Long Wang |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0701322 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701322 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.physa.2007.04.099 |
| Journal | Physica A, 383(2) (2007) 651-659 |
Abstract
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's Dilemma game with its immediate neighbors, after that, based upon self-interest, partial individuals may punish their defective neighbors by dismissing the social tie to the one who defects the most times, meanwhile seek for a new partner at random from the neighbors of the punished agent. It is found that the promotion of cooperation is attributed to the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure. Moreover, we show that the emerging social networks exhibit high heterogeneity and disassortative mixing pattern. For a given average connectivity of the population and the number of rounds, there is a critical value for the fraction of individuals adapting their social interactions, above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Besides, the effects of the average degree, the number of rounds, and the intensity of selection are investigated by extensive numerical simulations. Our results to some extent reflect the underlying mechanism promoting cooperation.
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"abstract": "We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the\nevolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices.\nWe propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round\nPrisoner\u0027s Dilemma game with its immediate neighbors, after that, based upon\nself-interest, partial individuals may punish their defective neighbors by\ndismissing the social tie to the one who defects the most times, meanwhile seek\nfor a new partner at random from the neighbors of the punished agent. It is\nfound that the promotion of cooperation is attributed to the entangled\nevolution of individual strategy and network structure. Moreover, we show that\nthe emerging social networks exhibit high heterogeneity and disassortative\nmixing pattern. For a given average connectivity of the population and the\nnumber of rounds, there is a critical value for the fraction of individuals\nadapting their social interactions, above which cooperators wipe out defectors.\nBesides, the effects of the average degree, the number of rounds, and the\nintensity of selection are investigated by extensive numerical simulations. Our\nresults to some extent reflect the underlying mechanism promoting cooperation.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0701322",
"authors": [
"Feng Fu",
"Xiaojie Chen",
"Lianghuan Liu",
"Long Wang"
],
"categories": [
"physics.soc-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1016/j.physa.2007.04.099",
"journal_ref": "Physica A, 383(2) (2007) 651-659",
"title": "Promotion of cooperation induced by the interplay between structure and game dynamics",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701322"
},
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