dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaFull security of quantum key distribution from no-signaling constraints
| Authors | Ll. Masanes, R. Renner, M. Christandl, A. Winter, J. Barrett |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0606049 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606049 |
| DOI | 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Volume 60, Issue 8, pages 4973-4986, year 2014 |
| License | http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ |
Abstract
We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices --- they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.
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"abstract": "We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key\nfrom correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and\nprove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption\nthat any information accessible to them must be compatible with the\nnon-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art\nsecurity definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable\nsecurity. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of\nmeasurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security\nis independent of the internal workings of the devices --- they do not even\nneed to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a\ncorrect and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The\ntechniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell\ninequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating\nBell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically\ndistributed.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0606049",
"authors": [
"Ll. Masanes",
"R. Renner",
"M. Christandl",
"A. Winter",
"J. Barrett"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph",
"cs.CR"
],
"doi": "10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417",
"journal_ref": "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Volume 60, Issue 8, pages\n 4973-4986, year 2014",
"license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
"title": "Full security of quantum key distribution from no-signaling constraints",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606049"
},
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