{
  "annotation_id": "6d75dec7-62bd-4b8a-80ea-3cf314b6eae5",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.458000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:13.458000Z",
  "file_hash": "4435a88585794cf9f2f99e937a82786abfb2bb47d468dc68f1f2ec4418ecc8b9",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Quantum bit seal is a way to encode a classical bit quantum mechanically so\nthat everyone can obtain non-zero information on the value of the bit.\nMoreover, such an attempt should have a high chance of being detected by an\nauthorized verifier. Surely, a reader looks for a way to get the maximum amount\nof information on the sealed bit and at the same time to minimize her chance of\nbeing caught. And a verifier picks a sealing scheme that maximizes his chance\nof detecting any measurement of the sealed bit. Here, I report a strategy that\npasses all measurement detection procedures at least half of the time for all\nquantum bit sealing schemes. This strategy also minimizes a reader\u0027s chance of\nbeing caught under a certain scheme. In this way, I extend the result of\nBechmann-Pasquinucci et al. by proving that quantum seal is insecure in the\ncase of imperfect sealed bit recovery.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0503031",
    "authors": [
      "H. F. Chau"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1016/j.physleta.2006.01.022",
    "title": "Insecurity Of Imperfect Quantum Bit Seal",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503031"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "dd566e65-9e2b-4907-8ff8-8940fd55eea6",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}