{
  "annotation_id": "6b0a4f5c-813c-4de9-ab23-320900aba742",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:35.522000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:35.522000Z",
  "file_hash": "546d3bc2c22c5347c87a7317f0c7ce8084177a36d45d322f7a391769b308e42e",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Evolutionary Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the\nspatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two\npure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional\nlattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are\ncontrolled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor $w$\ncharacterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching\nactivity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations $\\nu$ at the\nbeginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are\nperformed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of $w$ and\n$\\nu$ for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant\nincrease of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this\ndynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the\nexchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0610001",
    "authors": [
      "Attila Szolnoki",
      "Gyorgy Szabo"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE",
      "cond-mat.stat-mech"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1209/0295-5075/77/30004",
    "journal_ref": "Europhysics Letters 77 (2007) 30004",
    "title": "Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for   evolutionary Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma games",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0610001"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c0a79ec9-f56c-49ed-9ed0-ff82aa0495dd",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}